Monotone and Online Fair Division by Aleksandrov, Martin & Walsh, Toby
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
15
89
1v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
9 J
un
 20
20
Monotone and Online Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov and Toby Walsh
Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
{martin.aleksandrov,toby.walsh}@tu-berlin.de
Abstract. We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which in-
divisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles
of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such
as strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We prove a number of
impossibility results that justify why we consider relaxations of the properties,
as well as why we consider restricted preference domains on which good ax-
iomatic properties can be achieved. We propose two mechanisms that have good
axiomatic fairness properties on restricted but common preference domains.
1 Introduction
Many studies of fair division problems make some simplifying assumptions such as:
the problem is offline (i.e. the items and agents are all simultaneously available), and
agents have additive utilities over the items. In practice, however, such assumptions
may be violated. Recently, Walsh [29] introduced a simple online model for the fair
divison of indivisible items in which, whilst utilities remain additive, the items become
available over time and must be allocated to agents immediately. Such an online model
has many practical applications. For example, donated kidneys must be allocated to
patients as they become available. As a second example, places on university courses
open each term and must be allocated before classes begin, and before places open
for the following term. As a third example, a charging station might be allocated to a
waiting electric car immediately it is freed up. And, as a fourth example, perishable
items donated to a food bank might have to be allocated to charities feeding the poor
immediately. As a fifth example, when allocating memory to cloud services, we may
not know what and how many services are requested in the next moment.
In this paper, we relax this model of online fair division to deal with monotone util-
ities. There are many settings where utilities might not be additive. For instance, agents
may have diminishing returns for multiple copies of an item. You may, for example,
gain less utility for a second bicycle. Agents may also have complementarities. You
may, for example, get little utility for the cricket bat unless you also get the cricket ball.
We thus consider a model of online fair division in which agents have monotone but
possibly non-additive utilities. Indeed, monotone utilities are especially challenging in
an online setting. As utilities may not be additive, we cannot allocate items indepen-
dently of previous or, more problematically, of future items. Suppose agent 1 only likes
item a in the presence of item b, whilst agent 2 only likes a in the presence of c. Then
the decision to give item a to agent 1 or 2 may depend on whether items b or c will
arrive in the future, which we suppose is not known.
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We define firstly the model of online fair division with monotone utilities and
propose to consider non-wasteful marginal mechanisms for it. We then show that no
non-wasteful mechanism can guarantee simple axiomatic properties such as strategy-
proofness, envy-freeness (even approximately) or Pareto efficiency under weak condi-
tions, whilst that was possible with additive utilities. We then consider monotone util-
ities with non-zero marginals. In the offline setting, this is a natural class of restricted
preferences in which agents are assumed to prefer always having an item to not having
it, supposing that their marginal utility for it could be arbitrarily small. We prove that
many axiomatic properties can be achieved in this domain. We also consider a weaker
form of strategy-proofness adapted to our online setting that supposes agents only have
knowledge of the current item, and not of any future items that might or might not arrive.
Finally, we propose two mechanisms - the MINIMUM LIKE and MINIMUM UTILITY
mechanisms - and prove that they satisfy this weaker form of strategy-proofness as well
as envy-freeness up to some item in common domains with identical utilities.
2 Related Work
Our model of online fair division with monotone utilities generalizes an existing model
of online fair division with additive utilities introduced in [29]. Aleksandrov et al. [1]
analysed two simple randomized mechanisms for this model, called LIKE and BALA-
NCED LIKE. The LIKE mechanism allocates an incoming item uniformly at random
to one of the agents that declares non-zero bid for it. This is strategy-proof and envy-
free in expectation. The BALANCED LIKE mechanism allocates an incoming item to
an agent with the fewest items currently amongst those that declare non-zero bids for
the incoming item. With 0/1 utilities, this bounds the envy of agents, and is strategy-
proof for 2 but not more agents. Some other online mechanisms (e.g. MAXIMUM LI-
KE) that are Pareto efficient ex post and ex ante are considered in [3]. We can extend
these to mechanisms for monotone but not necessarily additive utilities by allocating
an incoming item to one of the agents that declares a non-zero marginal bid for the
item. However, we prove that none of these mechanisms or even any other mechanism
is strategy-proof, envy-free or Pareto efficient in our setting with monotone utilities.
Further, for the model with additive utilities, Benade et al. [9] showed that the ran-
dom assignment of each next item (i.e. LIKE) diminishes the envy over time. By com-
parison, we prove that approximations of envy-freeness ex post such as EF1 (see [12])
and EFX (see [13]) cannot be satisfied in our monotone setting. On the other hand, we
further prove that EF1 can only be satisfied in two restricted but common preference do-
mains of identical utilities. We also contrast our results with similar results in (offline)
fair division. For example, it remains an open question if offline EFX allocations exist
in general. We prove that no mechanism for online fair division can return such alloca-
tions even when they exist. This holds with identical additive utilities in which domain
there are offline algorithms that return such allocations [8]. Further, we can show that
some other (offline) characterizations (e.g. [10,25]) break in the online setting. In con-
trast, our results can be mapped to offline settings as online mechanisms can be applied
to offline problems by presenting the items in some (perhaps random) order.
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There are other related models. For example, Walsh [28] has proposed a different
online model in which items are divisible (not indivisible) and agents (not items) ar-
rive over time. Also, Kash, Procaccia and Shah [23] have proposed a dynamic model
of fair division in which agents again arrive over time, but there are multiple homo-
geneous (not heterogeneous) and divisible items. There is also a connection between
our consideration of marginal bidding and the one for auctions that has been made by
Greenwald and Boyan in [21]. One interesting difference between our work and theirs
is that marginal utility bidding is an optimal strategy for sequential auctions whereas,
as we prove, it may not be for online mechanisms. Finally, other related works in fair
division (e.g. [2,4,18,22]), voting (e.g. [15,19,30]) and kidney exchange (e.g. [16,17])
exist. However, our results do not follow from prior results.
3 Monotone and Online Fair Division
We consider an online fair division problem with agents from [n] = {1, . . . , n} and
indivisible items from O = {o1, . . . , om}, where m ∈ N≥1. WLOG, we suppose that
items arrive one-by-one from o1 to om. Thus, we write Oj for the subset of O of the
first j items. We suppose that agents have bundle utilities. We write ui(B) ∈ R≥0 for
the (private) utility of i ∈ [n] for each B ⊆ O. We also write ui(o) for ui({o}). We
suppose ui(∅) = 0. We say that the agents have identical utilities iff, for each i, k ∈ [n]
and B ⊆ O, ui(B) = uk(B). In this case, we write u(B) for ui(B). We further write
ui(B ∪{o})−ui(B) for the marginal utility of i ∈ [n] for eachB ⊂ O and o ∈ O \B.
We say that this marginal utility is general iff ui(B ∪ {o})− ui(B) ∈ R≥0, and non-
zero iff ui(B ∪ {o})− ui(B) ∈ R>0. We write pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) for an allocation of
the items fromB to the agents, where ∪i∈[n]pii = B and pii ∩pij = ∅ for i, j ∈ [n] with
i 6= j. And, we let Πj = {pi|pi is an allocation with ∪i∈[n] pii = Oj}.
We consider onlinemechanisms that allocate each next item without the knowledge
of any future items. We focus on non-wastefulmechanisms that allocate items to agents
that declare non-zero marginal utility for item oj , if there are such agents. At round
1, each agent i ∈ [n] becomes aware of their marginal utility ui(o1) for o1. And, at
round jth (j > 1), each agent i becomes aware of their marginal utility ui = ui(pii ∪
{oj}) − ui(pii) for oj where pi ∈ Πj−1 is some allocation of the first (j − 1) items.
The mechanism firstly asks each i ∈ [n] for a marginal bid vi for oj . Agents may act
strategically and bid insincerely, i.e. vi may be different from ui. We say that i likes oj
if ui > 0. The mechanism secondly shares the probability of 1 for oj among those who
make non-zero marginal bids. If there are no such agents, oj is allocated at random.
A mechanism thus returns a probability distribution over the allocations in Πj . We
write ∆j = (p(pi)|pi ∈ Πj) for it, where p(pi) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of pi ∈ Πj .
We have that
∑
pi∈Πj
p(pi) = 1. We write ui(pik) for the monotone utility of agent i
for the items of agent k in pi. We write uik(Πj) for the expected utility of agent i for
the expected allocation of agent k in Πj . We have uik(Πj) =
∑
pi∈Πj
p(pi) · ui(pik).
We also write sometime ui(pi) for ui(pii) and ui(Πj) for uii(Πj). Finally, we say that
ui(pik) is additive iff it is
∑
o∈pik
ui(o). In this case, the expected utility of agent i for the
expected allocation of agent k in Πj is also additive. That is, uik(Πj) = uik(Πj−1) +∑
pi∈Πj
p(pi) · ui(oj).
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4 Axiomatic Properties
Three fundamental axiomatic properties of mechanisms for our setting concern the in-
centives of agents to bid strategically for an allocation, the fairness of an allocation and
the economic efficiency of an allocation.
Definition 1 (Strategy-proofness, SP) A mechanism is SP in a problem with m items
if, with complete information of o1 to om, no agent i can strictly increase ui(Πm) by
misreporting ui(pii ∪{oj})− ui(pii) for one or more item oj and allocation pi ∈ Πj−1,
supposing that every other agent k 6= i bid sincerely their marginal utilities for items
o1 to om.
Definition 2 (Envy-freeness, EF) A mechanism is EF ex post (EFP) in a problem with
m items if, for each pi ∈ Πm with p(pi) > 0, no agent i envies another agent k, i.e.
∀i, k : ui(pii) ≥ ui(pik). It is EF ex ante (EFA) in a problem withm items if no agent i
envies another agent k in expectation, i.e. ∀i, k : uii(Πm) ≥ uik(Πm).
Definition 3 (Pareto efficiency, PE) A mechanism is PE ex post (PEP) in a problem
with m items if, for each pi ∈ Πm with p(pi) > 0, no pi′ ∈ Πm is such that ∀i :
ui(pi
′
i) ≥ ui(pii) and ∃k : uk(pi
′
k) > uk(pik). It is PE ex ante (PEA) in a problem with
m items if, no other probability distribution over the allocations in Πm gives to each
agent i at least ui(Πm) and to some agent k strictly more than uk(Πm).
We say that a mechanism satisfies a given property P iff, for eachm ∈ N, it satisfies
P on each problem with m items. We are interested in mechanisms for our model that
satisfy combinations of these three properties.
5 General Marginal Utilities
We start with general marginal utilities. As we argued earlier, the monotone and online
nature of our problem makes it more difficult to achieve nice axiomatic properties. In-
deed, we will show that no mechanism is strategy-proof, envy-free or Pareto efficient
even in very limited utility domains, e.g. monotone utilities with binary marginals, iden-
tical monotone utilities, etc.
5.1 Strategy-Proofness
We prove firstly that strategy-proofness is impossible in general. The problem here is
that the marginal utility of an agent for an item may depend on their allocation of past
items, and thus so is their probability for the item (in a given allocation). We illustrate
this in Example 1.
Example 1 Let us consider the online fair division problem with 2 agents and O =
{o1, o2}. Further, let u1(∅) = 0, u1({o1}) = 2, u1({o2}) = 4, u1(O) = 6 and u2(∅) =
0, u2({o1}) = 5, u2({o2}) = 2, u2(O) = 5. If agent 1 gets o1, the marginal utilities of
agents 1 and 2 for o2 are 4 (i.e. u1(O)−u1({o1})) and 2 (i.e. u2({o2})−u2(∅)). If agent
2 gets o1, the marginal utilities of agents 1 and 2 for o2 are 4 (i.e. u1({o2}) − u1(∅))
and 0 (i.e. u2(O) − u2({o1})). ⋄
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It might, therefore, be beneficial for an agent to report strategically a marginal utility
of zero for the current item in order to increase their chance for their most favourite
bundle of future items. Indeed, for this reason, no mechanism is strategy-proof even
with very restricted preferences. This contrasts with the case of additive utilities where,
for example, the LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof [1].
Theorem 1 No non-wasteful mechanism for online fair division is strategy-proof, even
with identical monotone utilities with 0/1 marginals.
Proof. Consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 to o3 and ordering (o1, o2, o3). The utilities
are identical for each B ⊆ O. If |B| = 1, let u(B) be 1. If |B| = 2, let u(B) be 2 if
B = {o2, o3} and 1 otherwise. Also, let u(O) = 2. Suppose agents are sincere and the
mechanism gives o1 to agent 1 with p ∈ [0, 1] and to agent 2 with (1− p). We consider
three cases. In the first case, the mechanism is randomized and p ∈ (0, 1). If it gives
o1 to agent 1 with p, then it gives o2 and o3 to agent 2 with probability 1. If it gives o1
to agent 2 with (1 − p) ∈ (0, 1), then it gives o2 and o3 to agent 1 with probability 1.
Therefore, the expected utility of agent 1 is equal to (2 − p). Suppose next that agent
1 report strategically 0 for o1. As the mechanism is non-wasteful, it gives o1 to agent 2
and o2 and o3 to agent 1 with probability 1. The (expected) utility of agent 1 is equal
to 2. This outcome is strictly greater than (2 − p) as p ∈ (0, 1). In the second case, the
mechanism is deterministic and p = 0. The mechanism gives o1 to agent 2 and o2 and
o3 to agent 1 with probability 1. The (expected) utility of agent 2 is 1. Suppose next
that agent 2 report strategically 0 for o1. The mechanism gives o1 to agent 1 and o2 and
o3 to agent 2 with probability 1. The (expected) utility of agent 2 is 2. This is a strict
improvement. Analogously, for the third case when p = 1. ⋄
5.2 Envy-Freeeness
We next confirm that nomechanism exists which is guaranteed to return envy-free allo-
cations even in ex ante sense, supposing agents bid sincerely. The key idea behind this
result is that a given agent may like a given bundle of items but not the individual items
in the bundle. By comparison, with additive utilities, the LIKE mechanism for example
is envy-free ex ante [1].
Theorem 2 No non-wasteful mechanism for online fair division is envy-free ex post or
even ex ante, even with monotone utilities with 0/1 marginals.
Proof. Let us consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 and o2 arriving from (o1, o2). Con-
sider u1(∅) = u1({o1}) = u1({o2}) = 0, u1(O) = 1 and u2(∅) = 0, u2({o1}) =
u2({o2}) = 1, u2(O) = 2. We note that an envy-free (offline) allocation gives one item
to each agent. However, an online and non-wasteful mechanism gives deterministically
both items to agent 2. Hence, agent 1 envies agent 2. ⋄
Interestingly, with identical monotone utilities, a distribution of allocations that
is envy-free in expectation can always be returned. For example, consider the non-
wasteful mechanism that allocates the current item to an agent who makes a non-zero
marginal bid for it and so far has been allocated items with the least declared utility.
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MINIMUM LIKE: At round j ∈ [m], given pi ∈ Πj−1, we let Like = {i|vi(pii∪
{oj}) > vi(pii)} and MinLike = {i|i ∈ Like, vi(pii) = mink∈Like vk(pik)}.
The mechanism gives oj to some i ∈ MinLike with probability (1/|MinLike|)
if MinLike 6= ∅ and, otherwise, to some i ∈ [n] with probability 1/n.
Theorem 3 With identical monotone utilities, the non-wastefulMINIMUM LIKE mech-
anism is envy-free ex ante.
Proof. The proof of the result hinges on any pair of agents getting a particular bundle
of items with the same probability. Pick agents i, k. We show uii(Πj) ≥ uik(Πj) for
j ∈ [1,m]. Let ∆uikj = uii(Πj) − uik(Πj). We have ∆uikj =
∑
pi p(pi) · ui(pii) −∑
pi p(pi) · ui(pik) where pi ∈ Πj . We derive the below expression for∆uikj .
∆uikj =
∑
A⊆O,B⊆O\A
( ∑
pii=A,pik=B
p(pi) · ui(A) +
∑
pii=B,pik=A
p(pi) · ui(B)
−
∑
pii=A,pik=B
p(pi) · ui(B)−
∑
pii=B,pik=A
p(pi) · ui(A)
)
Pick an allocation pi ∈ Πj . Let agent i get A ⊆ O, agent k 6= i get B ⊆ O \A and
each other agent h 6= i, k get pih in pi. By the symmetry of the utilities, there is another
allocation, say pi′ ∈ Πj , such that i getB, k getA and h get pih. With MINIMUM LIKE,
p(pi′) = p(pi). Moreover, with this mechanism, the number of returned allocations that
give A to i and B to k is equal to the number of returned allocations that give B to i
and A to k. Therefore, we derive∆uikj = 0 for each j ∈ [m]. ⋄
Further, we consider two common approximations of envy-freeness ex post: EF1
and EFX [11,13]. However, many other such approximations that are stronger than EF1
have been studied in the recent years, e.g. GMMS, PMMS, EFL [5,6,7].
Definition 4 (EF up to some item, EF1) A mechanism is EF1 if, for each pi ∈ Πm with
p(pi) > 0, for all i, k with pik 6= ∅, ∃o ∈ pik with ui(pii) ≥ ui(pik \ {o}).
Definition 5 (EF up to any item, EFX) A mechanism is EFX if, for each pi ∈ Πm with
p(pi) > 0, for all i, k, o ∈ pik with ui(o) > 0, ui(pii) ≥ ui(pik \ {o}).
Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee to only return allocations that are even envy-
free up to some item. This holds under very strong restrictions on the preference do-
main. Consequently, there are no EF1 (and, therefore, GMMS, PMMS or EFL) mecha-
nisms for our setting in general.
Theorem 4 No non-wasteful mechanism for online fair division is EF1, even with iden-
tical monotone utilities with 0/1 marginals.
Proof. Consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 to o4 and ordering (o1, o2, o3, o4). Let B ⊆
O. If |B| = 1, let u(B) = 1. If |B| = 2 and o1 ∈ B, let u(B) = 1. If |B| = 2 and
o1 6∈ B, let u(B) = 2. If |B| = 3 and B = {o2, o3, o4}, let u(B) = 3. If |B| = 3
and B 6= {o2, o3, o4}, let u(B) = 2. Also, let u(O) = 3. By these preferences, a non-
wasteful mechanism gives o1 to agent 1 and o2, o3, o4 to agent 2, or o1 to agent 2 and
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o2, o3, o4 to agent 1. WLOG, let agent 1 get o1 and agent 2 get o2, o3, o4. The utilities
of agents 1 and 2 in this allocation are 1 and 3 respectively. The allocation is not envy-
free because agent 1 envies agent 2. Moreover, the envy of agent 1 remains even after
the removal of any single item from the bundle of agent 2. Consequently, the allocation
is not EF1. However, we note that an EF1 (offline) allocation gives two items to each
agent. ⋄
By Theorem 4, the MINIMUM LIKE mechanism is not EF1. The result in Theorem 4
also contrasts with the offline setting where, with general monotone utilities, an EF1
allocation, bounding the envy from above by the maximummarginal utility of any agent
for any item, can always be achieved [24,27].
5.3 Pareto Efficiency
We lastly consider Pareto efficiency supposing agents bid sincerely. In the offline setting
with general monotone utilities, Pareto efficiency is guaranteed [14,26]. In our setting,
we show that there is no mechanism that is Pareto efficient, even just ex ante.
Theorem 5 No non-wasteful mechanism for online fair division is Pareto efficient ex
post or even ex ante, even with identical monotone utilities.
Proof. Consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 to o4 and ordering (o1, o2, o3, o4). The
utilities are identical for each B ⊆ O. If |B| = 1, let u(B) be 2 if B = {o3} or
B = {o4}, and 1 otherwise. If |B| = 2, let u(B) be 1 if B = {o1, o2} and 2 otherwise.
If |B| = 3, let u(B) be 3 if B = {o1, o2, o4} and 2 otherwise. Also, let u(∅) = 0 and
u(O) = 3. Further, consider below all possible allocations.
o1
o2
o2
o3
o3
o4
o4
o4
o4
({o2, o4}, {o1, o3})
({o1, o3}, {o2, o4})
({o2, o3}, {o1, o4})
({o1, o4}, {o2, o3})
p
1
1
r
q
1
1
1
1
Key: agent 1-dashed line, agent 2-solid line
Each mechanism induces some probabilities p, r, q ∈ [0, 1]. Such a mechanism
allocates deterministically o2 and o4 to agents. For example, suppose that agent 2 get
o1 with probability p. Then, agent 1 gets o2 with probability 1. Suppose that agent 2
gets o3 with probability r. Then, agent 1 gets o4 with probability 1. Each agent receives
utility of 2 in each of the four allocations. Hence, the agents’ (expected) utilities are
both equal to 2. These allocations are Pareto dominated by ({o1, o2, o4}, {o3}) in which
agents 1 and 2 get utilities 3 and 2 respectively. The result follows. ⋄
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6 Non-zero Marginal Utilities
We continue with non-zero marginal utilities. Interestingly, we can achieve most ax-
iomatic properties in this domain. Suppose we are interested in strategy-proofness,
Pareto efficiency ex post and ex ante. Consider a simple mechanism that gives deter-
ministically each next item to some fixed agent, say i ∈ [n]. Potentially, agent i may
wish to manipule the outcome. However, they then could only receive less items and,
therefore, strictly less utility. Consequently, this mechanism is strategy-proof and, for
the same reason, it is Pareto efficient even ex ante. Suppose we wish to achieve strategy-
proofness, Pareto efficiency ex post and envy-freeness ex ante. Consider a mechanism
that picks an agent, say i ∈ [n], uniformly at random with probability 1
n
and then gives
deterministically each next item to i. This mechanism is strategy-proof and Pareto effi-
cient ex post for the reasons that we mentioned above. It is further envy-free ex ante as
it returns a distribution of n allocations (say pii for i ∈ [n] that occurs with probability
1
n
and, WLOG, gives all items to agent i) in which the expected utility of an agent for
their own allocation and the allocation of another agent is the same.
Unfortunately, both of the above mechanisms are unappealing because they give
all items to some agent. Therefore, they are not EFX or even just EF1. In our online
and monotone setting, there are nomechanisms that are EF1 even when the utilities are
positive and additive, a special case of non-zero marginal utilities.
Theorem 6 No mechanism for online fair division is EF1, even with positive additive
utilities.
Proof. Let us consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 to o3 and ordering (o1, o2, o3). Further,
consider a mechanism and suppose that it is EF1. We consider two cases. In the first
one, we assume that it gives o1 to agent 1 with positive probability. Then, the utilities
of agents for items are given in the below table.
o1 o2 o3
agent 1 50 100 100
agent 2 100 50 100
WLOG, we can assume that the mechanism allocates o1 at the first round. As it is
EF1, it gives o2 to agent 2. Given this partial allocation, there are only two possible
allocations of o3, resulting in ({o1, o3}, {o2}) and ({o1}, {o2, o3}). It is easy to check
that none of them is EF1.
In the second case, we assume that the mechanism gives o1 to agent 2 with prob-
ability 1. Then, we consider different utilities of the agents for items o2 and o3. These
are given in the below table.
o1 o2 o3
agent 1 50 40 410
agent 2 100 200 200
The mechanism gives o1 to agent 2. As it is EF1, it would then give o2 to agent 1.
Given this partial allocation, the only two possible allocations after the third round are
({o2}, {o1, o3}) and ({o2, o3}, {o1}). It is easy to check that neither of them is EF1.⋄
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In contrast, a simple round-robin procedure returns an EF1 allocation in the offline
setting with general additive utilities [13]. There is some more hope for restricted pref-
erence domains on which to achieve EF1. For example, EF1 can be guaranteed in the
special case of identical monotone utilities with non-zero marginals.
Theorem 7 With identical monotone utilities with non-zero marginals, the non-waste-
ful MINIMUM LIKE mechanism is EF1.
Proof. We use induction on j ∈ [m]. In the base case, the allocation of o1 is trivially
EF1. In the step case, the induction hypothesis requires that pi ∈ Πj−1 with p(pi) > 0
is EF1. Let 1 ∈ MinLike and the mechanism allocate oj to agent 1 given pi. Consider
pi′ = (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n)where pi
′
1 = pi1∪{oj} and pi
′
i = pii for each i 6= 1. We next show that
pi′ is EF1. We note that the set Like = [n] as the agents’ marginal utilities are non-zero.
Case 1: Suppose i 6= 1 and k 6= 1. We have ui(pi′i) = ui(pii) and uk(pi
′
k) = uk(pik)
as pi′i = pii and pi
′
k = pik. By the hypothesis, we have ui(pii) ≥ ui(pik \ {o}) for some
o ∈ pik 6= ∅. Hence, ui(pi′i) ≥ ui(pi
′
k \ {o}) holds. Or, agent i is EF1 of agent k in pi
′.
Case 2: Suppose i 6= 1 and k = 1 ∈ MinLike. We have ui(pi′i) = ui(pii) as
pi′i = pii. By the mechanism, we have ui(pii) ≥ u1(pi1). As the utilities are identical, we
have u1(pi1) = ui(pi1). Hence, ui(pii) ≥ ui(pi1), or agent i is envy-free of agent 1 in pi.
We derive ui(pi
′
i) ≥ ui(pi1) = ui(pi
′
1 \ {oj}) as pi
′
1 = pi1 ∪ {oj}. Hence, agent i is EF1
of agent 1 in pi′.
Case 3: Suppose that i = 1 ∈ MinLike and k 6= 1. We have u1(pi′1) > u1(pi1)
as pi′1 = pi1 ∪ {oj} and the utilities are with non-zero marginals. By the hypothesis,
u1(pi1) ≥ u1(pik \ {o}) for some o ∈ pik 6= ∅. Hence, u1(pi′1) > u1(pik \ {o}) =
u1(pi
′
k \ {o}) as pi
′
k = pik. Therefore, agent 1 is EF1 of agent k in pi
′. ⋄
By Theorem 3, the MINIMUM LIKE mechanism is envy-free ex ante with identical
monotone utilities with non-zero marginals. However, it is not strategy-proof. In fact,
no other EF1 mechanism satisfies this property.
Theorem 8 No mechanism for online fair division is EF1 and strategy-proof, even with
identical additive utilities.
Proof. Let us consider two agents, items o1 and o2 arriving in (o1, o2). Further, let both
agents value o1 with 1 and o2 with 2. We consider two cases. In the first one, suppose
that the mechanism is randomized and allocates o1 to agent 1 with probability p ∈ (0, 1)
supposing agents 1 and 2 declare their sincere utilities for o1 and o2. Suppose it gives
o1 to agent 1. As the mechanism is EF1, it must give o2 to agent 2 with probability of
1. Suppose it gives o1 to agent 2. As the mechanism is EF1, it must give o2 to agent
1 with probability of 1. Hence, agent 1 receives expected utility (2 − p). If agent 1
report strategically 0 for o1, then the mechanism gives o1 to agent 2 and o2 to agent
1 with probability 1. The expected utility of agent 1 is now 2 which is strictly higher
than (2 − p) as p > 0. Hence, the mechanism is not strategy-proof. In the second case,
suppose that the mechanism is deterministic and allocates o1 to agent 1 with probability
1. Therefore, as it is EF1, it then allocates o2 to agent 2 again with probability 1. The
utility of agent 1 in this returned allocation is 1. If agent 1 report strategically 0 for o1,
then the mechanism swaps the items of the agents. The utility of agent 1 is now 2. This
is a strict improvement. We reached contradictions in both cases.⋄
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By Theorems 3 and 8, we conclude that the MINIMUM LIKE mechanism returns an
EF1 and envy-free ex ante allocation with identical additive utilities. In this case, the
agents’ utilities in each allocation is equal to the total sum of an agent’s utilities for the
items. For this reason, the mechanism is also Pareto efficient ex post and ex ante in this
case. Unfortunately, this no longer holds whenever the utilities are monotone.
Theorem 9 No mechanism for online fair division is EF1 and Pareto efficient ex post
or even ex ante, even with identical monotone utilities with non-zero marginals.
Proof. Let us consider two agents, items o1 to o3 arriving in (o1, o2, o3). The utilities
are given in the below table.
o1 o2 o3 {o1, o2} {o1, o3} {o2, o3} O
agent 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 5
agent 2 1 2 3 4 4 4 5
Let us consider a mechanism that gives item o1 to agent 1 with probability p ∈
[0, 1]. Suppose agent 1 receives item o1. As the mechanism is EF1, it then gives de-
terministically item o2 to agent 2 and item o3 to agent 1. Hence, the allocation pi1 =
({o1, o3}, {o2}) is returnedwith probability p. Suppose agent 2 receives item o1. By the
symmetry of the preferences, we conclude that the allocation pi2 = ({o2}, {o1, o3}) is
returned with probability (1 − p). We observe that pi1 is Pareto dominated by pi3 =
({o1, o2}, {o3}) and pi2 is Pareto dominated by pi4 = ({o3}, {o1, o2}). Hence, the
mechanism is not Pareto efficient ex post. Further, with the mechanism, the expected
utilities of agents 1 abd 2 are (2 + 2 · p) and (4− 2 · p) respectively. For p ≥ [ 12 , 1), the
first of these outcomes is less than 4 and the second one is at most 3. For p = 1, they
are 4 and 2. These expected allocations are Pareto dominated by pi3 in which agent 1
receive utility 4 and agent 2 receive utility 3. For p ∈ (0, 12 ), the first expected outcome
is less than 3 and the second one is less than 4. For p = 0, they are 2 and 4. These
expected allocations are Pareto dominated by pi4 in which agent 1 receive utility 3 and
agent 2 receive utility 4. Hence, the mechanism is not Pareto efficient ex ante. ⋄
In the offline setting, an EF1 (even EFX) and Pareto efficient ex post (and, therefore,
Pareto efficient ex ante) allocation can always be returned with identical monotone util-
ities whose marginals are non-zero [27]. Further, by Theorem 6, we cannot even hope
for mechanisms that satisfy the stronger concept of EFX with positive additive utilities.
In fact, this holds even in the more special case of identical utilities. This contrasts with
the offline setting [8].
Theorem 10 No non-wasteful mechanism for online fair division is EFX, even with
identical additive utilities.
Proof. Consider agents 1 and 2, items o1 to o3 and (o1, o2, o3). For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let
each agent have utility i for item oi. We note that two EFX allocations exist: ({o1, o2},
{o3}) and ({o3}, {o1, o2}). Consider a non-wasteful mechanism and suppose that it is
EFX. Hence, it would give o1 and o2 to different agents because it is online and cannot
predict that o3 will also arrive. WLOG, let agent 1 get o1 and agent 2 get o2. Given this
allocation, it is easy to see that any allocation of o3 leads to a violation of EFX. ⋄
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7 Extensions
In this section, we consider several extensions of our work as a response to our impossi-
bility results in the previous sections, that highlight the technical difficulty of our online
and monotone setting.
7.1 Online Strategy-Proofness
In deciding if agents have any incentive to misreport preferences in an online setting,
we may consider the past fixed but the future unknown. Indeed, we might not know
what items will arrive next, or even if any more items will arrive. This leads to a new
and weaker form of online strategy-proofness.
Definition 6 (Online strategy-proofness, OSP) A mechanism is OSP in a problem with
m items if, for each item oj ∈ O, fixed information of o1 to oj−1 and no informa-
tion of oj+1 to om, no agent i can strictly increase ui(Πj) by misreporting ui(pii ∪
{oj}) − ui(pii) given any allocation pi ∈ Πj−1, supposing that agent i bid sincerely
their marginal utilities for o1 to oj−1 and each agent k 6= i bid sincerely their marginal
utilities for o1 to oj .
Interestingly, the MINIMUM LIKEmechanism is online strategy-proof. The key idea
is that the probability of an agent for each next item given an allocation of the past items
is constant for each their positive marginal bid, supposing all other bids are fixed.
Theorem 11 The non-wasteful MINIMUM LIKE mechanism is online strategy-proof.
Proof. Consider a problem ofm items. Let us pick an arbitrary round j ∈ [m], alloca-
tion pi ∈ Πj−1 and agent i ∈ [n]. We consider two cases. In the first one, i 6∈ MinLike.
Then, this agent cannot increase ui(Πj) by misreporting ui(pii ∪ {oj}) − ui(pii) be-
cause, for any such misreported value, they remain outsideMinLike. In the second case,
i ∈ MinLike. Hence, they receive oj with probability 1/|MinLike| supposing they bid
ui(pii∪{oj})−ui(pii) that is positive. In fact, this holds for any other positive marginal
bid that they report for this item. However, this probability becomes 0 whenever they
report zero marginal bid for the item. We conclude that ui(Πj) cannot increase. ⋄
7.2 Wasteful Mechanisms
We say that a mechanism is wasteful iff it is not non-wasteful. Clearly, no wasteful
mechanism is Pareto efficient ex post or even ex ante simply because one can improve
the outcome of the mechanism by taking an item that is allocated to an agent who report
a zero marginal bid for it and giving it to some other agent whomake a positive marginal
bid for the item. We, therefore, focus on envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. Let us
consider the uniform mechanism that gives each next item to an agent with probability
1
n
given any allocation of past items. This mechanism is strategy-proof and envy-free ex
ante because no agent can increase their own outcome and each agent receives the same
probability for a given bundle of items. By Theorem 6, no wasteful mechanism is EF1
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in general. However, we can bound the envy ex post with identical monotone utilities.
For example, consider the wasteful version of the MINIMUM LIKE mechanism, i.e. the
MINIMUM UTILITY mechanism. This one is EF1 in this domain.
MINIMUM UTILITY: At round j ∈ [m], given pi ∈ Πj−1, we let MinUtil =
{i|i ∈ [n], vi(pii) = mink∈[n] vk(pik)}. The mechanism gives oj to some i ∈
MinUtil with probability (1/|MinUtil|).
Theorem 12 With identical monotone utilities, the wastefulMINIMUM UTILITY mech-
anism is EF1.
Proof. We can use induction on j ∈ [m] as in the proof of Theorem 7. In the base
case, the allocation of o1 is trivially EF1. In the step case, consider pi
′ = (pi′1, . . . , pi
′
n)
where pi′1 = pi1 ∪ {oj} and pi
′
i = pii for each i 6= 1, supposing that pi ∈ Πj−1 with
p(pi) > 0 is EF1. We next show that pi′ is EF1. Suppose i 6= 1 and k 6= 1. This follows
by Case 1 in Theorem 7. Suppose i 6= 1 and k = 1 ∈ MinUtil. This follows by Case 2
in Theorem 7. Suppose that i = 1 ∈ MinUtil and k 6= 1. We have u1(pi
′
1) ≥ u1(pi1) as
pi′1 = pi1 ∪ {oj}. As pi is EF1, u1(pi1) ≥ u1(pik \ {o}) for some o ∈ pik 6= ∅. Hence,
u1(pi
′
1) ≥ u1(pik \ {o}) = u1(pi
′
k \ {o}) as pi
′
k = pik. Therefore, agent 1 is EF1 of agent
k in pi′. We conclude that pi′ is EF1. ⋄
It is easy to see that the MINIMUM UTILITY mechanism is online strategy-proof
with general utilities and envy-free ex ante with identical utilities. However, by The-
orems 8, 9 and 10, we conclude that no wasteful mechanism, including MINIMUM
UTILITY, is EF1 and strategy-proof or EF1 and Pareto efficient, or just EFX.
As strategy-proofness is possible (e.g. the uniform mechanism), we might wish
to achieve even a stronger form of strategic robustness. For example, group strategy-
proofness captures the ability of groups of agents to manipulate mechanisms in their
joint favor [4].
Definition 7 (Group strategy-proofness, GSP) A mechanism is GSP in a problem with
m items if, with complete information of o1 to om, no group of agentsG can strictly in-
crease
∑
i∈G ui(Πm) by misreporting their marginal bids for one or more item oj and
allocation pi ∈ Πj−1, supposing that every agent k 6∈ G bid sincerely their marginal
utilities for items o1 to om.
Surprisingly, the (wasteful) uniform mechanism is group strategy-proof in general
as the outcome of a given group can only decrease supposing some agents from the
group bid strategically marginal zeros for some items, and cannot increase if some
of these agents bid strategically any combination of positive bids for some of these
items. By comparison, no non-wasteful mechanism is group strategy-proof even with
two agents who cooperate and have different positive utilities for one item [4]. However,
it remains an interesting open question if group strategy-proofness is achievable with
a non-wasteful mechanism in the case of identical monotone utilities with non-zero
marginals, or identical additive utilities. Nevertheless, by Theorem 8, such a mechanism
cannot be EF1.
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8 Conclusions
We consider a model for online fair division in which agents have monotone utilities
for bundles of items. We studied common axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this
model such as strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We analysed
these properties for several utility domains, e.g. general marginal utilities, non-zero
marginal utilities, identical utilities, etc. For non-wasteful mechanisms, most properties
cannot be guaranteed. For wasteful mechanisms, most properties can be guaranteed
in isolation. However, we also proved some impossibility results for combinations of
axiomatic properties. We summarize our results in Table 8.
Table 1. Key: ⋊⋉ - impossibility, X - possibility, + - discussion after, − - discussion before.
non-wasteful mechanisms wasteful mechanisms
general utilities identical utilities general utilities identical utilities
property
possibly 0
marginals
non-zero
marginals
possibly 0
marginals
non-zero
marginals
possibly 0
marginals
non-zero
marginals
possibly 0
marginals
non-zero
marginals
OSP X [T11] X [T11] X [T11] X [T11] X [T12]+ X [T12]+ X [T12]+ X [T12]+
SP ⋊⋉ [T1] X [T6]− ⋊⋉ [T1] X [T6]− X [T12]− X [T12]− X [T12]− X [T12]−
GSP ⋊⋉ [T1] ⋊⋉ [T12]+ ⋊⋉ [T1] open X [T12]+ X [T12]+ X [T12]+ X [T12]+
EF1 ⋊⋉ [T4] ⋊⋉ [T6] ⋊⋉ [T4] X [T7] ⋊⋉ [T6] ⋊⋉ [T6] X [T12] X [T12]
EFX ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10] ⋊⋉ [T10]
EFA ⋊⋉ [T2] X [T6]− X [T3] X [T3] X [T12]− X [T12]− X [T12]− X [T12]−
PEP+PEA ⋊⋉ [T5] X [T6]− ⋊⋉ [T5] X [T6]− ⋊⋉ [T12]− ⋊⋉ [T12]− ⋊⋉ [T12]− ⋊⋉ [T12]−
We also proposed two newmechanisms - MINIMUM LIKE and MINIMUM UTILITY
- that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness in general as well as envy-freeness ex
ante and ex post up to some item in two domains with identical utilities. We summarize
these results in Table 8.
Table 2. Key: × - does not hold, X - holds, + - discussion after, − - discussion before.
mechanism SP OSP EFA EF1 EFX PEA PEP
identical monotone utilities
MINIMUM LIKE × [T1] X [T11] X [T3] × [T4] × [T10] × [T5] × [T5]
MINIMUM UTILITY × [T8] X [T12]+ X [T12]+ X [T12] × [T10] × [T12]− × [T12]−
identical monotone utilities with non-zero marginals
MINIMUM LIKE × [T8] X [T11] X [T3] X [T7] × [T10] × [T9] × [T9]
identical additive utilities
MINIMUM LIKE × [T8] X [T11] X [T3] X [T7] × [T10] X [T9]− X [T9]−
Finally, our results hold in offline fair division as well because online mechanisms
can be applied to offline problems by picking up an order of the items. In future, we will
consider other utility domains such as sub- and super-additive, or sub- and sup-modular
utilities. We will also consider other relaxations of the considered properties and other
(e.g. not marginal) mechanisms for our model.
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